1 Introduction results are unequivocal: clarity diminishes volatility. Second, clarity of communication matters mostly for volatility of medium-term interest rates. Third, the effects of clarity vary over time. There is an indication that clarity has especially mattered during Alan Greenspan's term at the Federal Reserve. Overall, the analysis shows the importance of transparent communication on monetary policy.
Related literature
In the last two decades, many central banks have undertaken important steps towards more transparent communication. Two motives explain this transition.
First, communication can provide the necessary accountability that independent central banks should provide. (see, for example, Blinder (1998) , chapter 3.) Second, economic decisions depend in large part on expectations. Therefore, in addition to setting interest rates, central bank communications that influence expectations provide a second channel for stabilization of prices and output. (see Woodford (2006) or Blinder et. al. (2008) for further discussion).
Indeed, recent empirical work shows that central bank communication is an important source of information for financial markets. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) , for instance, find that communications by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank have been an important driver of financial markets. In an early paper in this literature, Kohn and Sack (2004) show that statements by the Federal Open Market Committee influence the volatility of asset prices -which implies that communication provides information to market participants.
Still, there is a continuing debate on what would be an optimal communica-tion strategy. There are many open issues: what information should be shared, how often should it be shared, in which form should it be shared, and how clear should the information be? This paper focuses on this last issue. At first sight, one would think that more precise information is beneficial from a social welfare perspective. However, a number of theoretical papers have argued that restricting transparency could be worth considering. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) argue that ambiguity enables monetary authorities to generate surprise inflation and stimulate economic activity. The central bank may, therefore, not choose the minimum feasible level of ambiguity, but rather a higher level as this help in stimulating the economy. Stein (1989) argues that it is not credible for the central bank to announce a target for the exchange rate. One solution may be to make imprecise announcements, for example by specifying ranges for the exchange rate rather than a single target level. Finally, Shin (2002, 2005, forthcoming) have argued that more precise public information may lead to lower social welfare because it acts as a focal point for economic agents. In their model, economic agents care about the correctness of their actions, but also intend to keep their actions closely in line with the actions of other agents. Public information serves as a focal point for the beliefs of the public. Morris and Shin show that if the coordination motive is sufficiently strong, and if private information is relatively precise, an increase in precision of public information can actually lead to lower social welfare. The intuition is that agents may place too much weight on the public signal.
The empirical research on central bank transparency has rapidly grown over the years (see Geraats (2002) , section 3 or Van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2007) , section 3 for an overview). Most of the literature has focused on con-5 structing measures of institutional transparency. These indicators focus on various aspects -such as the publication of a target for inflation, publication of policy deliberations and publications of macroeconomic forecasts. A wellknown example is the indicator constructed by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) .
There has been relatively little attention for the actual quality of the information provided. One exception is the monograph by Fracasso et. al. (2003) which evaluates the quality of inflation reports by twenty central banks. They find that the perceived quality of the writing style negatively correlates with monetary policy surprises -which suggests that transparency indeed reduces uncertainty in financial markets.
Two other related papers focus on Morris and Shin's argument on the precision of public information. Svensson (2006) stresses that the negative welfare effect of more precise public information only occurs if public information has a much lower signal-to-noise ratio than that of private information -which is not very realistic. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) Clarity of communication is intimately connected to the structure of the text which is communicated. The relationship between text structure and clarity is studied in a long history of research on readability which started in psychology.
Readability is defined as the ease with which a text can be read. I focus on readability because it is a fundamental precondition for transparency. If it is difficult to read a text, the content is likely to get diffused. There is also a larger probability that the reader does not finish reading the text.
3
I use two well-established statistics from the literature on readability. The first measure was introduced by Flesch (1948) . The Flesch reading ease score uses three variables: the number of words, sentences and syllables used in the 2 Blinder (2008) suggests that clearer communications have higher signal-to-noise ratios.
This means that clarity has implications for predictability as well as volatility.
3 By now, through advances in information technology, it is easier for market participants to watch live transmission of Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies. This raises the issue of differences between clarity of spoken and written communications. However, it seems not unreasonable to assume that, if a text is difficult to read, it will also be difficult to listen to the text being (Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers and Chissom (1975) 
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One benefit of these measures is that they are based on objective elements of the underlying texts. Taking other elements of communication into account through content analysis would introduce a degree of subjectivity into the analysis (for further discussion, see Blinder et. al. (2008) ). Nowadays, the Flesch score and the Flesch-Kincaid grade level are often integrated in software packages.
5
As noted, readability measures have been widely applied in psychology, education and linguistics. An application related to my paper is Resche (2004) who uses readability scores in a linguistic analysis of testimonies by Alan Greenspan. Two applications in economics are Laband and Taylor (1992) and Diamond and Levy (1994) who use readability statistics to evaluate the writing style of the economics profession.
I apply the readability statistics to the prepared testimony by the Federal
Reserve Chairman in the context of the Humphrey-Hawkins (HH) hearings.
Using the HH testimonies enables me to study developments in clarity of communication by one of the major central banks over a prolonged period of time.
To be precise, the sample starts in February 1979 and ends in July 2007. In total, I analyse 58 testimonies. Using the readability statistics, I study the effects of clarity on volatility for various financial variables. Table 1 lists these variables. I use data on interest rates, exchange rates and the stock market. I measure volatility as the standard deviation of daily changes in yields (for the bond data) or returns (for the exchange rate and stock indices). The event window includes ten business days, and starts on the day of the testimony. as Reuters or Bloomberg. By now, but not during the 1980s and 1990s, the text of the testimony will also be published on the internet. Later during the day, there will be coverage of the testimony through television and radio. On the day following the testimony, newspapers will publish stories relating and interpreting the testimony. Finally, there will be discussion of the testimony in various fora, such as magazines, web-logs, and analyst meetings, during a number of days following the testimony. Overall, the length of the event window is not clear. Therefore, in the appendix, I show that the conclusions on the effects of clarity are robust to varying the event window.
To identify the effects of clarity, I regress the natural logarithm of volatility on measures of readability and a number of control variables. If clarity has the expected effect on volatility, the estimated coefficient should be be negative when using the Flesch statistic and positive for the Flesch-Kincaid statistic. I use four categories of control variables. First, it is common in event studies to control for pre-event volatility. Often, researchers will do so by using the ratio of post-event and pre-event volatility as the dependent variable (see Clayton, Hartzell and Rosenberg (2005) or Dubofsky (1991) ). However, by using this ratio, one implicitly assumes the coefficient for pre-event volatility equals one.
I use a more flexible approach by including pre-event volatility as a separate control variable. Second, volatility may well depend on business cycle developments. I include three macroeconomic variables: growth in real gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, and changes in the money supply. 12 Using lags of these macroeconomic variables did not affect the estimation results. 13 One could consider other proxies for the content of the HH hearings. However, in newspaper reports on the hearings, the projections receive a lot of attention. For example, the economic outlook is often mentioned in the headlines. 14 Usually, both the full range and what is called the 'central tendency' of the projections by individual Federal Open Market Committee members are given. As the latter receives most emphasis in the testimonies, I focus on the central tendency.
13
William Miller (1979 ), Paul Volcker (1980 -1987 ), Alan Greenspan (1988 and Ben Bernanke (since 2006). There may well be important differences in communication styles which should be controlled for. Therefore, I include binary dummies for the various Chairmen. Even so, the sign of the significant parameters introduces the key result of this paper. When clarity matters, the results are unequivocal: clarity diminishes volatility. For the Flesch score, significant parameters are negative, meaning that a higher degree of readability means lower volatility. For the 15 As shown in figure 1 , the Flesch measure displays more variation than the Flesch-Kincaid measure, and is always higher in value. The result is smaller standard errors, which helps in picking up a significant effect of readability with the Flesch measure. 
Results

16
The coefficient for the pre-event volatility variables is often highly significant and positive. This result indicates that volatility in financial markets depends on its recent history. Using Wald tests, I can indeed always reject the hypothesis that this coefficient equals one which justifies using pre-event volatility as a separate control variable. Concerning the macroeconomic variables, there are a few significant variables, which are concentrated at the short end of the yield curve. For the four variables measuring the content of the Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies, especially the coefficients for expected inflation are significant. Again, they are concentrated at the short end of the yield curve. Finally, the Chairmen dummies are highly significant. One result has been that the predictability of monetary policy has greatly increased (Blinder et. al., 2008) . 
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Appendix:
Sensitivity analysis
First, I vary the length of the event window over which I compute volatility. for the Livingston proxy, and column 4 shows the coefficient when using the Consensus proxy. Most important, based on the sign of significant parameters, the conclusion regarding the role of clarity remains unchanged. The Consensus variable turns out to be a better proxy than the Livingston survey variable.
I also ran estimations with the Livingston and Consensus proxies included as additional variables in the baseline model. This left the conclusions regarding the effects of clarity unchanged.
Thirdly, I re-ran the baseline estimations with a dummy for the second testimony of each year, to account for possible time-varying volatility within a calender year. In most cases, this dummy was not significant, and the conclusion on clarity was unchanged. These results are available upon request.
Fourthly, I re-estimated all regressions using de-trended data. I de-trend the data using a Hodrick-Prescott filter which is more flexible than a linear trend. Given that I use semi-annual data, I set the smoothing parameter at 400. Table 7 shows that the conclusions regarding clarity are not affected.
Again, the coefficient for clarity is significant for the two-year and three-year maturity (in this case, at the 5 % level), and the euro-dollar rate. In addition, the coefficient for the Dow Jones index is significant at the 10 % level. The sign of the coefficients reinforces the conclusion: clarity diminishes volatility.
Finally, one may question the use of revised macroeconomic data. Volatility is determined by the information available to economic agents at a given point in time. Therefore, it could be advisable to use real-time macroeconomic data.
At the same time, the revisions in GDP, CPI and M2 are perhaps not so large as to overturn the estimation results. Indeed, this turns out to be the case. I have downloaded real-time data on GDP, CPI and M2 from the Philadelphia Federal
Reserve web-site.
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First, a visual inspection shows that revised and real-time data show similar developments over time. Second, I have re-estimated all regressions using real-time data. The coefficients for readability are displayed in table 8. The coefficients are similar to the results with revised macro data.
Most importantly, the conclusion remains that clarity diminishes volatility. .00
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